The Hottest Assets College Sports Has Not Yet Priced
Athletic programmes are becoming investable enterprises. The strongest HBCUs may offer what capital values most: powerful brands, undeveloped commercial rights and enormous room for growth.
Athletic programmes are becoming investable enterprises. The strongest HBCUs may offer what capital values most: powerful brands, undeveloped commercial rights and enormous room for growth.
College sports spent decades insisting that its programmes were not businesses. The market has stopped pretending.
Athletes can now receive direct institutional payments. Conferences are reorganising around television value. Universities are separating commercial operations from athletic administration. Private investors are financing ticketing, sponsorship, licensing, venues and digital media. The distinction between a sports programme and a sports enterprise has become increasingly difficult to maintain.
The University of Utah has already crossed the line. In June it finalised a partnership with Otro Capital and created Crimson Brand Partners, a separate company that will manage commercial activities across athletics, including sponsorships, ticketing, events, licensing and digital media. Utah retained majority ownership and decision-making authority. Otro acquired a significant minority interest. The university kept coaching, recruiting, scheduling and athlete support inside the institution. The business around the teams became investable.
The reported capital commitment reaches as high as $500m. Whether every dollar is ultimately deployed matters less than the precedent. A university athletic programme can now be divided into two parts: the institution that governs sport and the enterprise that commercialises it.
That means programmes are, in an important sense, for sale.
Not the university. Not admissions. Not the academic mission. Not the authority to select players or hire coaches.
But the economic platform surrounding the programme—its commercial rights, venues, content, hospitality, data, events and real estate—can be capitalised, licensed, financed and partly owned.
Investors will initially pursue the obvious targets. They will prefer athletic departments with large television distributions, wealthy donors and predictable cash flows. That is the safer trade.
It may not be the hottest one.
The more interesting assets may be institutions whose cultural value greatly exceeds their present revenue. By that measure, the strongest historically Black colleges and universities could be among the most mispriced properties in American sport.
HBCUs do not need capital to manufacture identity. They already possess it.
They need capital to build everything around it.
Misunderstood assets
HBCU athletics is usually placed into one of two categories.
The first is nostalgia. The stories centre on legendary players, marching bands, homecomings, classics and the period when HBCUs produced an extraordinary share of Black professional talent.
The second is need. The stories focus on underfunding, outdated facilities, small athletic budgets and competitive disadvantage.
Neither frame is especially useful to an investor.
Nostalgia does not produce a return. Need is not an asset class.
The more compelling argument is that selected HBCU programmes contain valuable sports enterprises that have never been adequately capitalised.
Their brands are inherited rather than invented. Their consumers are emotionally invested. Their events combine sport, music, fashion, food, alumni activity and Black professional culture. Their audiences include people who did not attend the institution but still identify with what it represents.
Few new sports properties can replicate that.
A private investor can build a stadium. It can hire salespeople, acquire technology and finance a media operation. It cannot easily create a century of institutional meaning.
That is why the opportunity should not be treated as a charitable exercise.
Capital would be entering after the hardest part of the brand-building process had already been completed.
The audience exists.
The value-capture system does not.
The programme is the platform
The mistake would be to invest only in football.
The stronger proposition is to build the entire athletic department.
Elite programmes are not successful because they own one impressive building. They are successful because dozens of functions operate together:
recruiting;
coaching;
player personnel;
strength and conditioning;
nutrition;
sports medicine;
recovery;
analytics;
academic support;
content production;
athlete compensation;
ticketing;
sponsorship;
premium hospitality;
and year-round event operations.
A recruit experiences this as one environment.
The indoor facility matters because weather no longer disrupts preparation. The nutrition programme matters because physical development is planned. The medical staff matters because an injury can determine a career. The content team matters because athletes now evaluate how effectively a school can build their visibility and commercial value.
This is where HBCUs face their greatest disadvantage.
An elite athlete may admire the history, culture and mission of an HBCU while still deciding that a wealthier programme offers a safer professional pathway. That is not disloyalty. It is a rational response to unequal resources.
The talent gap is therefore not merely a recruiting problem.
It is an infrastructure problem.
The experiment that has never been run
College sports has repeatedly asked whether elite Black athletes would choose HBCUs.
It has rarely asked what HBCUs could become if those athletes were offered comparable resources.
The brief rise of Jackson State under Deion Sanders offered a partial answer. The programme attracted national media, high-level transfers and Travis Hunter, one of the most coveted recruits in the country.
The usual interpretation was that an exceptional personality could overcome the limitations of an HBCU.
The more revealing interpretation was that top talent was willing to consider an HBCU once the opportunity felt large enough.
Jackson State had visibility. It had a coach with professional credibility. It had a compelling story. It did not yet have the institutional infrastructure required to make the moment self-sustaining.
That is the missing experiment.
What happens when the coach, culture and national attention are joined by:
a first-class performance centre;
competitive athlete compensation;
elite sports medicine;
a deep recruiting operation;
premium travel;
strong content production;
modern housing;
and a commercial platform capable of turning success into retained revenue?
No leading HBCU has been financed at that level across an entire department.
The market therefore does not know the ceiling.
That uncertainty is a risk.
It is also where the upside sits.
Three different assets
The strongest HBCU investment opportunities would not all follow the same model.
Howard University, Florida A&M University and North Carolina A&T State University illustrate three distinct commercial propositions.
Howard is the premium national brand.
FAMU is the consumer, football and entertainment property.
North Carolina A&T is the scale, technology and infrastructure play.
They are not the only candidates. Grambling State, Southern, Jackson State, Tennessee State, Hampton and others possess valuable brands and traditions.
But Howard, FAMU and A&T show how capital could create three different types of sports enterprise.
Howard: prestige waiting for infrastructure
Howard already possesses something most athletic departments spend heavily to obtain: relevance beyond sport.
The university has approximately 14,500 students and competes in 19 Division I sports. Its alumni network, Washington location and institutional reputation give the Howard name a reach far larger than its current athletics income.
For a corporate partner, Howard can offer more than signage.
A sponsorship can be connected to recruitment, entrepreneurship, healthcare, technology, media, public policy and one of the country’s most influential Black professional networks.
That makes Howard a premium property trapped inside relatively modest athletic infrastructure.
Capital could close the gap.
The initial programme should include a vertically designed performance centre with indoor training, strength and conditioning, nutrition, recovery, sports medicine, recruiting rooms and content production.
The second priority should be staff. Facilities recruit athletes, but people develop them. Howard would need deeper coaching, medical, analytical, recruiting and commercial teams.
The third should be athlete economics. Howard does not need to win every financial contest with the wealthiest programmes. It must make attendance financially credible enough that elite athletes do not treat the choice as a professional sacrifice.
Basketball may offer the fastest path to national relevance. A small number of elite players can transform a roster more quickly than in football. Howard’s brand and Washington location could support nationally significant men’s and women’s programmes, premium events and a modern arena with year-round uses.
The larger development opportunity is a Howard sports-and-culture district containing hospitality, housing, healthcare, media production, alumni space and retail.
The school does not need to become the largest athletic department.
It could become the best-positioned one.
FAMU: a lifestyle brand with teams attached
Florida A&M is already one of college sport’s most recognisable HBCU properties.
Its football tradition, visual identity, Florida base and Marching “100” create something broader than an athletic programme. The brand can be experienced through competition, music, apparel, travel and culture.
FAMU has also produced athletic figures such as Bob Hayes, Althea Gibson and Pro Football Hall of Famer Ken Riley, while the Marching “100” has represented the university on major international stages.
This gives FAMU the clearest consumer proposition.
A fully financed department would need an indoor practice facility, comprehensive football-performance centre, improved sports medicine, stronger nutrition, better Olympic-sport infrastructure and a sophisticated commercial operation.
Bragg Memorial Stadium should become a higher-yield venue rather than merely a larger one.
Premium clubs, hospitality, modern concessions, stronger merchandise sales, reliable connectivity and flexible event space would produce more value than undifferentiated capacity.
FAMU has already contemplated a much broader stadium-area redevelopment involving new athletic facilities, structured parking, a hotel, shops and restaurants.
That is the correct scale of ambition.
The stadium is not the project.
The project is a year-round destination anchored by football.
The Marching “100” could also support a carefully managed content and entertainment business involving documentaries, performances, educational programming, touring, archival media and premium merchandise.
The danger would be over-commercialisation. The band’s value comes from authenticity. That authenticity must be protected because it is the source of the commercial appeal.
With adequate capital, FAMU could offer elite Florida recruits a proposition few programmes could match:
stay in one of America’s richest talent markets;
play inside a nationally distinctive atmosphere;
build a personal brand;
and receive elite development without accepting inferior resources.
FAMU would no longer be asking athletes to choose culture instead of opportunity.
It could offer both.
North Carolina A&T: scale that can compound
North Carolina A&T may present the most balanced institutional case.
Its enrollment passed 15,000 in 2025, making it the first HBCU to reach that mark. The university also describes itself as a high-research-activity land-grant institution and has continued to invest in housing, engineering and broader campus growth.
Scale matters commercially.
Every incoming class expands the future market of alumni, donors, ticket buyers, subscribers and corporate contacts. A&T has a larger base from which to build recurring demand than most HBCUs.
Its homecoming demonstrates that demand vividly. The university says the event now attracts at least 150,000 people to Greensboro, with expectations that the 2026 centennial celebration could exceed 200,000.
That is not merely a campus celebration.
It is regional economic infrastructure.
A&T could build an athletics-and-innovation district around that demand.
The physical platform might include an indoor multi-sport facility, sports medicine, biomechanics, recovery, artificial-intelligence research, wearable-technology testing, athlete media studios, housing, hospitality and a modern arena.
This would allow A&T to sell more than sports sponsorship.
A technology company could sponsor athletics, recruit engineering graduates, test products and support research through one relationship.
A healthcare system could operate rehabilitation and performance services for athletes and the community.
A developer could finance housing, hospitality and retail supported by the university’s year-round population and major events.
A&T’s appeal is therefore not simply that it might build a winning football team.
It could become a multi-sport, research-connected athletic enterprise.
Developers should look beyond the stadium
The most important investors may not be traditional sports funds.
Developers should see HBCU athletics as an opportunity to build entire districts.
The university provides several things that are difficult to assemble elsewhere:
land;
a permanent population;
a powerful identity;
and recurring events.
The development partner can add:
stadiums and arenas;
performance centres;
sports medicine;
student and athlete housing;
hotels;
conference space;
restaurants;
retail;
media studios;
parking;
and community recreation.
The athletic programme creates demand.
The district turns that demand into diversified revenue.
This solves one of the central problems in sports-facility finance. A stadium used for several home games cannot easily support a large capital stack. A mixed-use district can generate income every day through rents, healthcare, hospitality, events and university occupancy.
The land should not need to be sold.
A long-term ground lease can allow a developer to build and operate assets while the university retains ownership of the underlying property. The institution can receive ground rent, revenue participation, facility access and eventual ownership of the improvements.
For HBCUs, this is especially important.
Land is intergenerational wealth. It should be used as leverage, not liquidated to close temporary budget gaps.
Athletes can become owners
There is another investor group that should be paying attention.
Professional athletes increasingly want ownership in sports enterprises rather than permanent roles as endorsers of businesses controlled by others.
Major professional franchises are expensive and rarely available. Even a small minority position may require an enormous cheque while offering little influence.
HBCU athletic enterprises could provide a different path.
Current and former athletes could invest alongside universities, developers and institutional capital in:
commercial-rights companies;
performance centres;
sports-medicine facilities;
media businesses;
hospitality;
housing;
youth academies;
and surrounding real estate.
They would not own the university. They would not control recruiting, admissions or coaching.
They could own part of the economic platform being built around it.
That distinction could be powerful.
Athlete investors would bring more than money. They could advise on training, recovery, nutrition, personal branding and professional preparation. They could introduce sponsors, healthcare partners, media businesses and other investors.
Their presence would also matter to recruits.
A prospect would see former athletes not merely celebrated in photographs but returning as owners and builders of the system.
That changes the story.
The programme would no longer be asking successful Black athletes to donate to compensate for underinvestment.
It would be inviting them to invest in an appreciating sports asset.
Programs are becoming available
University leaders may resist the phrase “for sale”.
They should understand what it means.
The institution itself is not for sale. Its commercial future is negotiable.
Universities can now create separate companies, grant long-term rights, accept minority investment and use outside capital to build infrastructure.
That means programmes are entering the market whether presidents and trustees describe them that way or not.
Those that act early will have more control over their terms.
Those that wait until financial pressure becomes acute may find themselves selling future income merely to cover present expenses.
HBCUs have a particularly strong story to tell investors because their proposition is based on growth rather than maintenance.
A mature power-conference programme may seek capital to preserve its competitive position.
An HBCU can argue that capital will create a new one.
That is a more ambitious story and, if properly structured, a more valuable one.
The structure matters
The university should retain control over:
academics;
admissions;
coaching;
athletic policy;
conference membership;
athlete welfare;
Title IX compliance;
institutional trademarks;
and land.
A separately governed commercial company could manage:
sponsorship;
ticketing;
premium hospitality;
licensing;
content;
events;
concessions;
and selected real-estate operations.
The investor’s return should come primarily from incremental revenue created after the transaction.
The institution should not hand over a large share of income that already exists simply to receive capital upfront.
Any agreement should include independent valuation, competitive bidding, limits on debt, performance milestones, transfer restrictions, audits and university repurchase rights.
The term should be patient.
A five-year private-equity timetable is not suited to university development, facilities and brand-building. Fifteen to 25 years is more consistent with the assets.
The object is not to find the largest cheque.
It is to find capital capable of leaving behind a stronger institution.
The risk is real
These assets are hot partly because they are difficult.
The first risk is overbuilding. A facility is not productive merely because it is impressive.
The second is debt. Future ticketing and sponsorship revenue can be pledged long after optimistic projections have failed.
The third is governance. Universities may lack the transaction experience required to negotiate with sophisticated investors.
The fourth is cultural extraction. Homecoming, band culture and institutional history can be commercialised until the audience no longer recognises them.
The fifth is displacement. Sports districts can increase surrounding land values while excluding the communities that sustained the institution.
The sixth is dependence on winning. A financial model that requires championships to service debt is not an investment plan.
The business must survive ordinary seasons.
The hottest unpriced assets
Private capital will continue to move into college sports.
The initial deals will favour established programmes with visible cash flows and low perceived risk. They will attract attention because the numbers are large.
The more compelling investments may be the ones where capital changes the asset rather than merely purchasing a piece of it.
Howard, Florida A&M and North Carolina A&T already possess the things investors find hardest to create:
recognition;
loyalty;
history;
culture;
community;
and belief.
The rest can be built.
Facilities can be built.
Performance systems can be built.
Recruiting departments can be built.
Medical and nutrition operations can be built.
Athlete-compensation platforms can be built.
Media companies can be built.
Hotels, housing and entertainment districts can be built.
The unanswered question is what these programmes become when they no longer ask elite athletes to choose them despite the resources.
What happens when the resources become part of the reason to choose them?
That is the wager.
HBCU programmes should not enter this market apologetically. They should not present themselves as institutions in need of rescue.
They should present themselves as scarce sports properties whose commercial and competitive ceiling has never been properly tested.
Programs are becoming available.
Capital is looking for stories.
Few stories in American sport are stronger than an institution with a century of cultural equity, an established audience and a business that has barely begun to scale.
The market may soon discover that the hottest assets in college sports were not hiding.
They were simply underfunded.